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THE NEW INTERSTATE COMPACT - A
CONGRESSIONAL TOOL: SEATTLE

MASTER BUILDERS ASS'N v. PACIFIC
NORTHWEST ELECTRIC POWER
The compact clause of the United States Constitution1 provides a mechanism by which states may form cooperative agreements governing issues of regional concern.2 Originally used merely
to settle boundary disputes,3 compacts have become an effective
means for states to solve a wide variety of problems involving taxation, mass transit, air pollution, land use planning, water resources
and education.4 The expansion of compacts into areas previously
recognized as exclusively within the federal domain 5 has been acI U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The compact clause provides that "[n]o State shall,
without the Consent of Congress .. . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State. . . ." Id. Despite the broad language of the compact clause, not all agreements between states fall within the ambit of the clause. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518
(1893). A compact only requires consent if it is "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or
interfere with the just supremacy of the United States." Id. at 519; see also United States
Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978) (compact that promotes
uniform state tax systems does not require consent); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S.
363, 369 (1976) (compact locating boundary not threat to federal supremacy). Compacts
which pertain to particular subjects automatically require congressional consent. See, e.g.,
The Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 70 Stat. 498
(1956) (congressional consent required for compacts which involve water pollution). Subjects
such as mental health, higher education, and juvenile compacts do not need congressional
consent. See F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 24
(1976).
2 See F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, supra note 1, at ix; see also Frankfurter & Landis,
The Compact Clause of the Constitution - A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.
J. 685 (1925) (advocating uses of compacts).
' See F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL supra note 1, at ix; Leach, The Federal Government and Interstate Compacts, 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 421, 421 (1961).
' See F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, supra note 1, at ix; Leach, supra note 3, at 422.
' See Port of New York Authority Compact, Pub. Res. No. 67-17, 42 Stat. 174 (1921).
The Port Authority affects interstate commerce and thus involves a federally preemptible
area. See M. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS - A QUESTION OF FEDERALISM 27 (1971). While
the regulation of commerce is expressly reserved to the federal government, see U.S. CONST.
art I, § 8, cl. 3, "Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause also extends to intrastate
economic activities that affect interstate commerce." Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985); see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941)
(same). As such, Congress may confer upon a state the power to regulate commerce by
granting consent to an interstate compact. See Dixon, Constitutional Bases for Regional-

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:813

companied by increased federal participation in the formation and
administration of compacts." Despite this increase in federal participation, compact agreements have traditionally been negotiated
and drafted by the member states.7 Recently, however, in Seattle
Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Electric Power,8 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of an interstate compact agreement that was completely devised by CongressY
ism: Centralization; Interstate Compacts; Federal Regional Taxation, 33 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 47, 64 (1964).
0 See Leach, supra note 3, at 426. The federal government has participated in interstate compacts on the negotiation and administration levels, id., and recently, has taken
part as a full member of an interstate compact. See Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L.
No. 87-329, 75 Stat. 688 (1961). The Delaware River Basin Compact includes the federal
government as a full voting member together with the states of Delaware, New Jersey, New
York and Pennsylvania. Id. at 689.
The federal government often assigns personnel to participate and represent federal
interests in the formulation of compacts. See Cellar, Congress, Compacts, and Interstate
Authorities, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 682, 690 (1961). The Bureau of Budget has formulated The Guide to Federal Participationin Interstate Compact Negotiation, which details
the role of the federal representative. See Heron, The Interstate Compact in Transition:
From Cooperative State Action to Congressionally Coerced Agreements, 60 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1, 21 n.113 (1985). In 1961, 18 out of 30 operating interstate compact agencies had
federal representatives. See H.R. REP. No. 310, 87th Cong., lst Sess. 13 (1961). See, e.g.,
Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663 (1951) (federal representative
serves as tie-breaker); The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-39, 63
Stat. 31, 35 (1949) (allows for presidentially-appointed commissioner); The Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, Pub. L. No. 76-739, 54 Stat. 752, 753 (1940) (provides for
presidential appointment of three members of compact).
See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 2, at 692. At common law, early compacts were
derived through negotiations between the contending colonies, and were often subject to the
approval of the Crown. Id. The negotiations were traditionally undertaken by joint compact
commissions composed of representatives of each state and appointed by the Governor. See
F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, supra note 1, at 16. In the interest of speed and simplicity,
the modern trend favors a less formal negotiation process. Id. at 18. Often interested state
officials will draft an agreement, which will be enacted by the state if acceptable. Id. The
enactment constitutes an offer to the other states to join. Id.
8 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit had jurisdiction pursuant to the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act (Pacific Northwest Act), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(4) (1982). Pursuant to Rules
35 and 40 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, both parties have filed a petition for
rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc in April 1986. See Respondent's Petition for
Rehearing No. 83-7585; Petitioners' Petition for Rehearing, No. 83-7585.
' Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1363. The Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conversation Council's ("Council") member states include Washington, Oregon, Montana, and Idaho. Id. at 1362. The parties and various amici disagreed about
whether the Council constituted a federal agency or an interstate compact organization. Id.
at 1363. The Pacific Northwest Act expressly states that the Council is not a federal agency.
See 16 U.S.C. § 839 b(a)(2)(A)(iv) (1982). The Council is similar to a federal agency because
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In Seattle Master Builders, a group of homebuilders and
other industry representatives brought suit against the Pacific
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Council
("Council"). 10 The task of the Council was to prepare and adopt a
conservation and electric power plan to be implemented by the
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), a federal agency.'1 Each
state agreed to participate in the Council by enacting legislation
that authorized the governor to appoint two members. 12 The petitioners claimed that the Council was "unusual," thus invalid, because it was congressionally created and its activities directly affected a federal agency.' 3 The plaintiffs further asserted that the
creation of the Council violated the appointments clause of the
Constitution 4 because the Council members exercise significant
it has "authority in law to make decisions," Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1974), and can "act with the sanction of the
Government behind it." Ellsworth Bottling Co. v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 280, 282
(W.D. Okla. 1975). The Pacific Northwest Act expressly states that the Council must follow
federal law in particular situations.
For the purpose of providing a uniform system of laws, in addition to this chapter,
applicable to the Council relating to the making of contracts, conflicts-of-interest,
financial disclosure, open meetings of the Council, advisory committees, disclosure
of information, judicial review of Council functions and actions under this chapter, and related matters, the Federal laws applicable to such matters in the case of
the Bonneville Power Administration shall apply to the Council to the extent appropriate, except that with respect to open meetings, the Federal laws applicable
to open meetings in the case of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission shall
apply to the Council to the extent appropriate.
16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(4) (1982).
The Council reports its activities in the Federal Register and adheres to the requirements of the "Government in the Sunshine Act" with regard to open meetings. See 49 Fed.
Reg. 28,342 (July 1, 1984); Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982). Furthermore, the Council is federally funded. See Pacific Northwest Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(c)(10)
(1982). The Council's activities are suitable for a federal agency. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(b)
(alternative establishment of Council as federal agency). Despite the logomachy concerning
the Council's classification, it is submitted that the Council acts pursuant to federal law.
10 Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1362.
" See Pacific Northwest Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(1), (2) (1985).
2 See IDAHO CODE § 61-1201 to -1207 (1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 90-4-401 to -404

(1985); OR.

REV. STAT.

§ 469.800 to -845 (1985);

WASH. REV. CODE

§ 43.52A.010 to -.050

(1986).
'3 See Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1364.
14 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The appointments clause states:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
the [S]upreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers,
as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Court of Law, or in the Heads
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authority over the federal government, yet have not been appointed by the President. 15 As a third cause of action, the claimants challenged the Council's regional energy plan as an arbitrary
and capricious exercise of authority.16
of Departments.
Id. (emphasis added).
The term "Officers of the United States," as used in article II, has been defined to
include "all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government." See United
States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1879) (civil surgeons appointed by Commissioner of
Pensions held not to be "Officers of the United States"). The Supreme Court firmly stated
that there can be no doubt that all officers of the United States were intended to be included within one of the two modes of appointment provided by art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Id. The
Court further elucidated the meaning of officers of the United States in Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1975). The Court in Buckley asserted that the term officers of the United States,
as defined by United States v. Germaine, was intended to have "substantive meaning." Id.
at 126. The Court stated that "any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to
the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of the United States' and must, therefore, be
appointed in the manner prescribed by section 2, cl. 2 of that Article." Id. Officers of the
United States do not include all employees of the United States. Id. at n.162. Commissioners may be distinguished from employees because they are appointed for a statutory term
and "are not subject to the control or direction of any other executive, judicial or legislative
authority." Id.; see Pacific Northwest Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(3) (1982) (statutory term for
Council members).
15 See Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1365. The Ninth Circuit did not dispute
that the Council exercises significant authority over the BPA. Id. at 1365. See, e.g., 16
U.S.C. § 839b(i) (1982) (Council may review BPA's action); id. at § 839(j) (Council can
request Administrator to act); id. at § 839 (j)(2) (Administrator must respond to Council's
request within 90 days); id. at § 839b(j)(3) (Council may request informal hearing and final
reviewable decision). Nonetheless, the court held this authority to be immaterial. Seattle
Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1365. See also Hemmingway, The Northwest Power Planning
Council: Its Origins and Future Role, 13 Emw.
L. 673, 684 (1983) (asserting that Council
does not exercise significant authority).
Although the Council does not have the final word over the BPA's actions, see 16 U.S.C.
§ 839 d(c)(3)(B) (1982) (if inconsistent with Plan, Administrator may petition Congress for
permission to acquire that resource), it is submitted that the Council indeed exercises significant authority over the BPA. The Plan uses language which requires the Administrator to
act at the behest of the Council. Chapter 10 of the Plan provides in pertinent partThe Council has used the word "shall" in this two year action plan, when referring
to actions to be carried out by Bonneville, to express the Council's expectations
that these actions can and should be implemented. . .to ensure proper coordination in the implementation of these actions, the Council intends that all Bonneville actions in the two-year plan shall be taken in consultation with the Council.
Northwest Conservation & Electric Power Plan Vol. I at 10-3, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,493 (June 1,
1983). Representative Dingell, the Chairman of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Subcommittee on Energy and Power, and Co-Floor Manager of the Act in the House, noted:
"The Council has more than planning authority; it acts as a check on the administrator."
126 CONG. REc. H. 27815 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1980) (quoted in Petitioners' Opening Brief at
51, Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1359).
6 Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1362. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that an agency's factual finding may be set aside if arbitrary and capricious. See 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). The Council is directed to adopt model conservation standards
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Writing for the majority, Judge Goodwin refused to categorize
the Council's attributes as "unusual," and thus held it in accordance with constitutional requirements. 17 Reasoning that congressional creation of the Council through a federal act merely constituted conditional consent in advance,' 8 the Ninth Circuit did not
address the fact that Congress had drafted the entire agreement. 19
The court recognized that "[t]here is no bar against federal agencies following policies set by non-federal agencies," and held that
the impact on the federal government did not affect the Council's
validity pursuant to the compact clause.]2 0 In determining whether
the Council violated the appointments clause, the court employed
the three part test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Buckley v.
applicable to new and existing structures which will "produce all power savings that are
cost-effective for the region and economically feasible for consumers. . . ." Pacific Northwest Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839 b(f)(1) (1982). The petitioners attacked the Council's definition of
cost effectiveness as unreasonable. See Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1368. The
claimants further alleged that the conservation standards cannot be economically feasible
for owners of rental housing because the market will not support the rental increases necessary to compensate for an increase in construction costs. Id. at 1369. The Ninth Circuit held
the Council's determination of the model standards to be reasonable and in accordance with
the Pacific Northwest Act, id. at 1370, and therefore not arbitrary or capricious. Id.
17 Compare Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1364 (holding agency's attributes not
to be unusual) with Hemmingway, supra note 15, at 673 (asserting that Council is a "unique
experiment in American federalism" and that "there is nothing else quite like it"). Hemmingway further stated: "On its face the Northwest Power Planning Council does not resemble the usual compact agency." Id. at 687 (emphasis added).
18 See Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1364; see also Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S.
433, 441 (1981) (Congress may condition its consent or grant consent in advance). Unlike
the Pacific Northwest Act at issue in Seattle Master Builders, the sole purpose of the Crime
Control Consent Act of 1934 in Cuyler was to provide consent for the formation of a compact in the future. Id. The Crime Control Consent Act did not attempt to detail an agreement for the states. Id. See Crime Control Consent Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 909 (1934).
19 See Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1364.
20 Id. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 670 (1978) (federal government
must apply to state for appropriation permit pursuant to waiver of federal immunity under
section 8 of Reclamation Act); Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n. v. Schlesinger, 643
F.2d 585, 603 (9th Cir. 1981) (BPA must give State of Washington information relevant to
environmental standards required by state law). But see Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S.
441, 448 (1942) (Florida may not mandate that United States Department of Agriculture
comply with state fertilizer inspection requirements); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 55
(1920) (Maryland may not require United States Post Office truck driver to obtain state
driver's license). However, although the federal government may waive its immunity pursuant to the supremacy clause in limited instances, this situation is distinguishable from Seattle Master Builders because the Council exercises significant authority over a federal agency
and does not act pursuant to generally applicable state laws. The majority's holding that it
is immaterial that a compact agency exercises significant authority over a federal agency, as
long as it acts pursuant to state law, is erroneous. This result allows a federal agency to be
completely subjugated to a compact agency in violation of the supremacy clause.
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Valeo. 21 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Council survived
Buckley analysis and thus did not violate the appointments clause
because the Council's members did not solely serve pursuant to
22
federal law.
In dissent, Judge Beezer asserted that the majority had elevated form over substance when it concluded that the Council was
a lawfully formed compact agency.23 The dissent contended that
"the Council lacks several of the classic indicia of an interstate
compact. '24 Judge Beezer concluded that the Council constituted a
federal agency because power to constrain actions of a federal
agency is not a legitimate function of an interstate compact
agency. 2' Even ifthe Council was a legitimate interstate compact
agency, the dissent argued that it still violated the appointments
clause because the Council exercises significant control over a federal agency and acts pursuant to federal law.28
The Ninth Circuit has construed the consent requirement of
the compact clause broadly to allow Congress wide discretion to
create a state-appointed body which may have significant effects
on a federal agency. It is submitted that the Council violates basic
contract principles governing compact agreements and thus is not
21

424 U.S. 1, 123-27 (1975). The Buckley test provides that the appointments clause

applies to: 1) all executive or administrative officers; 2) who serve pursuant to federal law;
and 3) who exercise significant authority over federal governmental actions. Id. at 126.
Buckley involved the provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act creating an eight
member commission to administer that Act. Id. at 109. The commission's functions involved
record keeping, disclosure, investigative functions, rulemaking and adjudicative powers. Id.
at 109-10. The Court recognized that Congress may appoint its own officers to perform "appropriate legislative functions." Id. at 119. Such functions are limited to those of an "investigative and informative nature." Id. at 137. The Buckley Court held that the commission
was not exercising "appropriate legislative functions," and thus was subject to the provisions of the appointments clause. Id. at 143.
In Seattle Master Builders, the Council is not limited to "investigative and informative
functions." See, e.g., Pacific Northwest Act 16 U.S.C. § 839b(i) (1982) (Council may review
actions of BPA); id. at § 839d(c)(2)(A) (Council determines if BPA Administrator's actions
are consistent with plan); id. at § 839b(j) (Council may request Administrator to undertake
action pursuant to plan).
Past Supreme Court decisions are consistent with the holding in Buckley. See
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625-26 (1935) (Congress cannot usurp President's power to appoint even if agency is quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative); Springer v.
Phillipine Islands, 227 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1928) (legislative branch may not exercise executive
authority by retaining power to appoint those who will execute its laws).
22 See Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1365.
22 See id. at 1372.
24

Id.

25

Id. at 1373.

26 Id. at 1376.
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a compact at all. The creation of the Council has resulted in an
unconstitutional redistribution of power which restricts the power
of both the states and the executive. This Comment will assert
that congressional creation of the Council has effectively robbed
the states of their traditional role in the negotiation and drafting
of compact agreements, and usurped the executive's power of
appointment.
INDICIA OF A COMPACT

In Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors,27 the Supreme Court enunciated four factors that support the existence of
a compact agreement. Although not a comprehensive list, the
Northeast Bancorp Court declared the following to be "classic indicia" of a compact agreement: (1) a joint agreement; (2) statutes
conditioned on action by the other state[s]; (3) the absence of an
ability to unilaterally modify or repeal the agreement; and (4) a
reciprocal regional limitation.2 8 The majority in Seattle Master
Builders concluded with a cursory analysis that the Council satisfied these indicia. 29 However, a more thorough analysis demonstrates that the Council does not satisfy the last three of the
Northeast Bancorp indicia.30
An interstate compact is manifestly a contract between
states. 1 Thus, the second of the NortheastBancorp indicia, mutuality of obligation, is paramount.3 2 This concept was integral to the
Supreme Court's decision in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission.3 The United States Steel Court expressly
rejected the contention that a compact clause agreement was
27
28

105 S. Ct. 2545, 2554 (1985).
Id.

29 See Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1363. "The Council is an operational body
established by reciprocal legislation whose effectiveness is conditioned upon binding legislative commitments by the states." Id. (emphasis added). It is submitted that reciprocal legislation whose effectiveness is conditioned upon binding legislative commitment by the states
is distinguishable from binding reciprocal legislation within the meaning of Northeast

Bancorp.
30 See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
31 See F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, supra note 1, at 7. The concept of offer, acceptance, and consideration are all applicable to the formation of a compact agreement. Id. at 8-

9.

92 See

id. at 9-10.
452, 468-71 (1978) (challenging constitutionality of Multistate Tax

33 434 U.S.

Compact).
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formed when each member state had the freedom to adopt or reject the Multistate Tax Commission's rules.3 4 The Court dismissed
such an agreement as "nothing more than reciprocal legislation
... ," Rather than making binding commitments to a compact

agreement, the member states in Seattle Master Builders merely
passed reciprocal legislation that agreed to promulgate a plan for a

federal agency.36 The Council fails to conform with the third

Northeast Bancorp indicia because none of the state statutes preclude the state from unilaterally modifying or repealing the
agreement.
Additionally, the contractual principles which govern compacts require that member states may not be contractually bound
without their consent.3 7 Yet, Congress provided for the creation of
the Council upon consent of only three of the four states to be
affected by the Council's decisions. 38 The absence of a valid regional limitation, the fourth Northeast Bancorp indicia, further
militates against the conclusion that the Council is a compact. 39
Therefore, because it failed to meet three of the four requirements
set out in Northeast Bancorp, the Council in Seattle Master
Builders cannot reasonably be considered an interstate compact.4
1,Id.
35

at 475-76.

Id.

"e

See IDAHO CODE § 16-1201 (1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 90-4-401 (1985); OR. REV. STAT.
469.800 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43-52A.010 (1986). This state legislation merely
gives consent to participate in the Council; there is no obligatory language. Significantly,

§

none of the statutes refer to the agreement as a "compact".
37See F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, supra note 1, at 7-8. The substantive law of compacts is contract law and thus a state which has not accepted the offer to join the agreement
cannot thereafter be bound by that agreement. The acceptance of the agreement constitutes
the consideration. Id. at 9.
38See Pacific Northwest Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2) (1982).
31 See id. at §§ 839a(14)(A), 839 a(14)(B) (Pacific Northwest region extends
beyond the
states of Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington).
40 Commentators' traditional notions of what constitutes a compact seem
to indicate
that the Seattle Master Builders Council is not a compact. See F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE 1925 42 (1951). Compacts are 1) formal and contractual agreements; 2) between the states themselves; 3) enacted in substantially identical
words by the legislature of each compacting state; 4) requiring consent of Congress in certain cases; 5) enforceable by suit in the Supreme Court of the United States; 6) that take
precedence over ordinary state statutes. Id. The Council in Seattle Master Builders meets
only one of these six criteria. The Council is not a contractual agreement, and no agreement
exists between the member states. See supra note 15 (states have agreed to "constrain" the
BPA, but not themselves). Further, the state enactments substantially differ. Compare
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43-52A.040 (1986) (Council members removable at Governor's will)
with OR. REV. STAT. § 469.830 (1985) (Council members not removable at Governor's will);
see also People v. City of South Lake Tahoe, 466 F. Supp 527, 541-42 n.29 (E.D. Cal. 1978)
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CREATION VS. CONSENT: THE LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER

The compact clause is a constitutional vehicle which enables
states to negotiate agreements addressing regional problems
"wholly unsuited to federal action ....-

Only if a compact in-

42
fringes upon federal power is congressional consent necessary.
However, the Seattle Master Builders court has held that the

power to consent also gives Congress the power to create. 43 It is

asserted that a crucial distinction exists between the authority to
consent to an agreement and the authority to create one.44
Consent has been extended to include a "supervisory role,"
but the extent of this concept has yet to be defined by the Su(suggests that state enactments should be identical in every respect).
If the Council is a compact, Zimmerman & Wendell's fifth requirement for a compact
agreement indicates that its judicial review provisions violate the Constitution. See Pacific
Northwest Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839f(e)(5) (1982). This provision states: "Suits to challenge the
constitutionality of this chapter, or any action thereunder,final actions and decisions taken
pursuant to this chapter by the Administrator or the Council, or the implementation of such
final actions . . .shall be filed in the United States court of appeals for the region." Id.
(emphasis added). The Constitution provides that in all cases in which a state is a party, the
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction, but if the dispute involves two states the
Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl.
2; F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, supra note 1, at 46-47; Ladd, Federal and Interstate Conflicts in Montana Water Law: Support For a State Water Plan, 42 MONT. L. REv. 267, 278
(1981). Section 839f(e)(f) mandates that all actions be brought in the U.S. court of appeals
regardless of whether it concerns a dispute between two states. Finally, the Council's plan
does not take precedence over state statutes as dictated by Zimmerman & Wendell's criterion six. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 61-1201 (West Supp. 1985) (providing that "[n]othing in
this agreement shall be construed to alter, diminish or abridge the rights of the state").
41 See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 2, at 708.
42 See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519-20 (1893); Heron, supra note 6, at 12;
Leach, supra note 3, at 439. ("If the ruling in Virginia v. Tennessee still has meaning, Congress' consent merely attest[s] to its conviction that the compact does not infringe on federal powers and jurisdiction. Nothing More.") (emphasis added). In order to preserve the
national interest, Congress may condition this consent. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,
440 (1981); Petty v. Tennessee Mo. Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1959).
" Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1364.
" See Heron, supra note 6, at 22 n.116 (power to consent to treaty does not extend to
power to create treaty). Analogously, congressional power to consent to Presidential appointments does not further empower Congress to make those appointments. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129 (1976). The consent requirement should not be used to abrogate the
state's power to negotiate and draft compact agreements. See City of El Paso v. Simmons,
379 U.S. 497, 509 (1965). "[W]hatever is reserved of state power must be consistent with the
fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The reserved power cannot be
construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor is the limitation to be construed to destroy
the reserved power in its essential aspects." Id. (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934)) (emphasis added). Granting Congress the power to create compact agreements for the states would destroy this reserved power in its essential
aspects.
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preme Court.45 A noted district court case involving the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey intentionally left this issue
unresolved in order to avoid constitutional confrontation. 4 Neither
the majority nor the dissenting opinion adequately addressed the
distinction between congressional consent and congressional creation of a comprehensive compact agreement. Although the Council's regulation of electricity involves the national interest, 47 granting the federal government the power to draft interstate compact
agreements is not necessary to protect this interest. 4" Our system
of checks and balances is threatened when Congress receives free
reign to regulate itself. 49 State consent to usurpation does not
grant Congress the authority to exceed its constitutional limitations.50 Although congressional drafting may result in a more expe-

" Ambiguity concerning the scope of this role has led to disagreement between commentators. Compare Cellar, supra note 6, at 699-702 (arguing that Congress has right to
alter or amend compact agreement and therefore has right to investigate) with Leach, supra
note 3, at 428 (asserts that Congress' supervisory role does not extend to investigative authority); see also Note, ConstitutionalLaw - Power of CongressionalCommittee To Investigate an Interstate Compact Denied Due to Lack of Grant of Specific Authority, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 581, 586 (1963) (Constitution specifically restricts congressional compact
activity to granting or withholding consent).
"' Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1962).
Tobin raised the issue of whether the Constitution allows Congress to retain a reviewing role
over an interstate compact to which it had already given consent. The controversy arose in
response to Representative Emanuel Cellar's initiation of an investigation into the activities
of the Port Authority. See M. RIDGEWAY, supra note 5, at 24. Cellar demanded general
records of the Authority be made available for congressional scrutiny. Id. Austin Tobin,
executive director of the Port Authority, was prosecuted for contempt of Congress for his
refusal to furnish subpoenaed documents. Id. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed Tobin's conviction, but based its decision on nonconstitutional
grounds. See Tobin, 306 F.2d at 274-75. The court held that the congressional committee
could not investigate the Port Authority's internal affairs absent a clear intention to retain
such a power in the compact. Id. at 275-76. Congressional reservation of "the right to alter,
amend, or repeal" consent was not sufficient to confer authority to supervise internal affairs.
Id. at 274. The court refused to address the constitutional issue: "We have no way of knowing what ramifications would result from a holding that Congress has the implied constitutional power to 'alter, amend, or repeal' its consent to an interstate compact." Id. at 273.
47 See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 2, at 714. "To be sure, the transmission of
electricity across State borders is interstate commerce and as such subject to the Federal
power evolved for the control of such commerce." . . . Id.
" See Heron, supra note 6, at 23. "Any suggestion that Congress might use its plenary
power under the Commerce Clause, rather than its limited power under the Compact Clause
to establish arrangements such as the Northwest Power Council is also without merit." Id.
'9 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 589 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (warns that lack of check on congressional power could result in unitary
government).
50 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (Presidential consent did not negate
usurpation of executive power); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926) (same).
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ditiously created agreement than if the states negotiated their own
compact, granting Congress such a power would impermissibly impede state initiative to formulate their own agreements, and thus
impair the states' integrity as states. 5 1 Ironically, the Council has
None of the member states objected to the congressional creation of the Council by joining
the Seattle Master Builders litigation, see Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1361, although Montana, Idaho and Washington did file amicus briefs. Id.
" For almost a decade, the Supreme Court has wrestled with the issue of how far Congress' power pursuant to the commerce clause may intrude upon the states' domain. See
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 530 (1985). Garcia overruled
the doctrine of sovereign immunity developed in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), which held that state governments were immune from the 1974 Fair Labor
Standards Act. See Garcia,469 U.S. at 557. In NationalLeague of Cities, the Court distinguished between federal regulation "of private sector and. . .businesses necessarily subject
to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the State in which they
reside," and federal regulation "directed, not to private citizens, but to the States as
States." National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845. National League of Cities emphasized
that "traditional governmental functions" must be free from federal regulation. Id. at 852.
Garcia rejected the concept of "traditional governmental functions" as unworkable, but did
not expressly disavow the concept of "States as States." See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531-57.
This concept is applicable to the usurpation of the states' role in the compact process in
Seattle Master Builders. In Garcia, the Court held the basic structure of the federal system
provides adequate protection to the states, and therefore refused to circumscribe the limits
of congressional power. Garcia,469 U.S. at 550-51. However, it must be noted that in Garcia, the preservation of state sovereignty necessitated the deprivation of the individual
rights protection afforded by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 533. It is suggested that
preservation of state sovereignty with respect to the compact clause requires no such sacrifice; on the contrary, it may serve to enhance individual rights. See Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1103 (1977) (arguing National League of Cities
actually preserved personal rights by upholding state sovereignty).
The Garcia Court's five to four decision, with three rigorous dissenting opinions, suggests that the issue of state sovereignty has not been laid to rest. Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor expressed confidence that the principle of National League of Cities will
in time again command the majority of the Court. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 589 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). "The central issue of federalism, . . . is whether any realm is left open to the
states by the Constitution. . . ... Id. at 580-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
It is submitted that drafting a compact agreement is a realm intended by the Constitution
to be left open to the states. Cf. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911) (regulation of
state capital is peculiarly a state function and must be free from federal regulation). A legitimate interstate compact agency is legally a state agency. See R. LEACH & R. SUGo, THE

22 (1959). It is suggested that because a compact
agency is a state entity, the regulation and drafting phases of the compact process peculiarly
belong to the states. The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress cannot supercede the
states in the control of their state agencies. See, e.g., Ashton v. Cameron County Water
Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 528 (1936) (taxing power of Congress does not
extend to political subdivisions of states); Hopkins Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Cleary, 296
U.S. 315, 337 (1935) (conversion of state associations into federal ones beyond congressional
authority).
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been proclaimed as a new form of cooperative federalism, 52 despite
the congressional usurpation of a traditional state role.
Curtailment of state involvement in interstate compacts is violative of the spirit of interstate compacts and basic precepts of state
53
sovereignty.
THE COMPACT CLAUSE: AN EXCEPTION TO THE APPOINTMENTS
CLAUSE?

The Seattle Master Builders court dismissed the petitioner's
claim that the Council violated the appointments clause because
the Council was acting under the aegis of an interstate compact.5
However, "[tihe relevant inquiry must be one of impact on [the]
federal structure," not on the name affixed to that structure. 5 The
Council acts pursuant to federal law because it was created by
Congress, rather than by the states.56 The guise of an interstate
compact cannot controvert the fact that if the three prongs of
Buckley are satisfied, the appointments clause must be complied
57

with.

Contrary to the opinion of the majority, a separation of powers
problem does exist in Seattle Master Builders.5 8 Historical analysis reveals that the compact clause was not intended to be an exception to the appointments clause.59 A proposed amendment that
52 See Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1366 (Council represents innovative cooper-

ative federalism); Hemmingway, supra note 15, at 673 (Council constitutes example of trend
reversing pendulum of federal authority in direction of states).
51 See M. RIDGEWAY, supra note 5, at 1 (spirit of interstate compacts is regional cooperation); Leach, supra note 3, at 446 (overriding objective of compacts is to avoid federal
interference in regional planning).
See Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1365. The majority contended that the
Council acts pursuant to state law because the member states enacted consent legislation.
Id. It is submitted that the state consent legislation cannot insulate the Council from the
appointments clause because the Council acts pursuant to federal law. See supra note 9.
"' See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978).
" See supra note 9.
" See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123-27 (1976).
58 See Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1365. The court denied that a separation of
powers problem exists. Id. Federalism may not insulate the Council from separation of powers scrutiny; the two concepts are not mutually exclusive. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18 (1978) (it is not possible to clearly separate federalism issues from separation
of powers issues).

11 See 2 M.

FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION

405 (1911). When the

Constitutional Convention debated the executive's appointment power, Edmund Randolph
suggested that the legislature be permitted "to refer appointments in some cases, to some
State Authority." Id. John Dickinson of Delaware proposed an amendment which would
have allowed Congress to delegate the power of appointment to "the Legislatures or Execu-
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would have permitted Congress to delegate the power of appointment was expressly rejected at the Constitutional Convention.6
Thus, the fact that Congress expropriates the power of appointment and grants it to a state governor, rather than to itself, is irrelevant. 1 Despite the fact that state-appointed commissioners might
be more effective, the compact clause should not be utilized as a
legal convenience to circumvent constitutional requirements.2
CONCLUSION

The Seattle MasterBuilders decision has given the green light
to Congress to create a "regional council," label it an interstate
compact, and dodge the appointments clause. In its eagerness to
spur a new form of "cooperative federalism," the Ninth Circuit has
created a new governmental species which runs afoul of both the
compacts clause and the appointments clause. Such a precedent is
offensive to the axiomatic precepts of federalism and separation of
powers.
Lisa Ann Schoolman

tives of the several States." Id. at 406. A modified proposal which would have permitted
vesting appointment power in state executives alone was expressly rejected. Id. at 406 n.12.
60 Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). The
Framers saw that "[tihe legislative department [was] every where extending the sphere of
its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex", and thus sought to prevent
congressional usurpation. Id. at 333.
6" Cf. Seattle Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1374 (Beezer, J., dissenting); see also L.
TRmIE, supra note 58, at 184-85 (appointments clause acts as check on the legislative
branch).
62 See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
"[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating
functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution." Id. Chadha invalidated the legislative veto despite the fact that it invalidated hundreds of statutes dating back to the 1930's. Id. at 944-45. Analogously, it is irrelevant that
applying the appointments clause to the Council may invalidate other compacts. See Seattle
Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1365 (majority asserts petitioners' claim would virtually outlaw
all compacts). The Court in Chadha noted "our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by
the fact that congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing frequency."
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).

